tives, he argues, more likely to serve the genuine interests of working teachers, students, and working-class parents.

However, his specific contribution to the critical literature at this stage, as well as throughout the text, is his explicit and extensive treatment of teachers as workers and political/cultural actors. What does critical pedagogy mean when we treat its implications for workplace organization seriously? Carlson responds to this question. Interestingly, the potential of this standpoint is limited by his use of post-structuralist theory to argue that “teacher unions will need to begin working to overcome bipolar opposition between educational labor and management if they are to re-empower the teaching occupation and restructure schools in democratic ways” (p. 247). This is a stance which he warns against taking too far. Nevertheless, the conclusion is one of the richest chapters in a book certainly worth reading by those prepared to join or continue the battle against conservative entrenchment in schools.

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The title of this work, it should be understood, refers not so much to its focus as to its structure: six essays on curriculum history and six on curriculum theory. Of the twelve essays, eleven have been previously published. Only “Keeping Out of Nature’s Way: The Rise and Fall of Child Study as the Basis for the Curriculum, 1880-1905” is published for the first time. The rest originally appeared in such publications as Curriculum Inquiry, Peabody Journal of Education, American Journal of Education, and American Educational Research Journal.

In curriculum history, besides the above named, there are pieces on the rise of scientific curriculum-making, Dewey and the Herbartians, liberal arts curriculum and general education, the decline of the humanities in the American school curriculum, and “success and failure in educational reform” and the “lessons” to be drawn therefrom. The essays in curriculum theory include Kliebard’s 1970 essay on “The Tyler Rationale,” as well as essays on Dewey and curriculum theory, bureaucracy and curriculum theory, and one on the problem of teacher education, all from the 1970s; and “Curriculum Theory as Metaphor” (1982) and “Vocational Education as Symbolic Action” (1990). With the exception of these last two essays, which are marvellous, and of which more below, those readers familiar with Kliebard’s work will not find any surprises here. Readers unfamiliar with Kliebard’s work, who have some knowledge of the history of American education and curriculum theory, may celebrate the range of subjects on which he knowledgeably touches but, again with the exception of “Cur-
riculum Theory as Metaphor” and “Vocational Education as Symbolic Action,” will find this book sterile and dull; it really doesn’t seem to matter at all. I take it, however, that the reviewer’s principal function is to open a text, to make it more meaningful to the reader. What can the reviewer do to make Forging the American Curriculum more meaningful? Well, one thing he can do is follow Dominick LaCapra’s advice. In contrast to a “documentary” reading which mines a work for “facts,” he can give the work a “dialogic” reading, one which contextualizes the work and aims for an expansion of the reader’s awareness.

In the last two decades there has been a virtual explosion of multi-disciplinary interest in narrative and in theorizing about narrative. The study of narrative has become a fruitful source of concepts and insights for all branches of the humanities and the social sciences: viz, literary/linguistic studies, philosophy, and historiography. The narrativist turn was largely motivated by Hayden White’s seminal Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe (1973), which introduced the central idea that historical narratives were “constructions” rather than “findings,” essentially rhetorical or metaphorical in nature. More recent inquiry into narrative and narrative models have focused on the micro, small, or little narrative versus the grand or metanarrative. The case for the small as opposed to the grand narrative has been put forward by Lyotard, the influential theorist of the postmodern, who defines postmodernism as “incredulity toward metanarratives.” Lyotard’s main objection to the grand narrative is its “totalizing power” (his ultimate opprobrium), which is to say, the totalitarian, universalizing, mystifying operations of grand narrative as opposed to the small narrative, praised by Lyotard for its local, contingent, and nontotalizable textual energy. But Lyotard’s is too unforgiving a view of the grand narrative and too complacent and naive a view of the small narrative. As has been pointed out by Fredric Jameson and Richard Rorty, among others, small narratives are textually thin, bland, and more or less obvious, while grand narratives are complex and textually dense; they are characterized, in Clifford Geertz’s phrase, by “thick description.” The small narrative tends to overcome the reader with detail or bore the reader because of lack of detail. The grand narrative satisfies our desire for understanding the present and envisioning a different future. Finally, the small narrative can be and inevitably is more “totalizing” than the grand narrative. The small narrative is not an innocent discourse; it is itself a site of exclusion. By its very nature the small narrative is constrained and limited and, in the Foucaultian sense, an exercise of power. There is in the small narrative (as of course, in the grand narrative) the power to silence, censor, exclude, marginalize. This is the space in which Kliebard works—the small narrative.

Kliebard’s essays are textually thin, monological. Everything is too simple, transparent, and unproblematic. Kliebard is neither self-reflective of his own versions of
curriculum history or theory nor does he engage any alternative versions in a dialogue. But curriculum history and curriculum theory have never existed as monolithic discourses. To take Forging the American Curriculum at its face value would lead one to believe there were no other historians of curriculum, no other curriculum theorists, as if there were no other works written in its period or about its subject matter, as if there were no tradition, or canon in the curriculum field, or rival discourses within this tradition or rival texts within the canon. To make meaning of a work like this one must uncover what it omits, represses, or conceals as much as—or rather, more than—what it includes. To make meaning of Forging the American Curriculum, we need to move from what is explicit in the work to its “articulated silences,” those discourses or “stories” Kliebard declines to acknowledge or represent. The blanks, gaps, omissions, and deletions are an integral part of this text and a crucial determinant of its meaning. To put it otherwise, to breathe life into this work, the absent text must be resuscitated by the reader. The absent text is the alternative discourses which have been agitating the field of curriculum history and curriculum theory for at least the past two decades.

In his historical pieces on child study, scientific curriculum-making, Dewey and curriculum theory, or William Torrey Harris and the decline of the humanities curriculum, there is no reference to the late Lawrence A. Cremin and his The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education, 1876-1957, a classic grand or metanarrative which, whatever its problems, deals at length with the child-study movement, scientific curriculum-making, Dewey, and Harris. One doesn’t have to agree with Cremin’s interpretation, but surely his work deserves, if not some consideration, perhaps a footnote. But Kliebard writes as if Cremin and The Transformation of the School never existed. Nor is there in his pieces on the humanities, the liberal arts curriculum and general education, or on the “lessons” to be drawn from school reform movements, any acknowledgement of the theoretical insights to be accrued from critical theory, poststructuralism, or postmodernism. There is no Pinar, Apple, or Giroux, no Foucault or Gramsci. In his Introduction, Kliebard observes, correctly, that curriculum is an arena “in which various interest groups struggle for dominance and control” (p. xv). One would not know, however, from the essays in this volume, that the interesting questions are, for example: why is “liberal education” accepted as “liberal education”?; why is “general education” accepted as “general education”; what is the relation between curriculum discourse and power?; or that curriculum is at the vortex of a larger political struggle over conflicting social and cultural agendas.

By far the most arresting essays in Forging the American Curriculum are “Vocational Education as Symbolic Action” and “Curriculum Theory as Metaphor.” These are brief but wonderful pieces, beautifully conceived and executed and overtly intertextual: the first influenced by authors as diverse as Kenneth Burke, Daniel T.
Rodgers, and Murray Edelman; the second resting on, among other works, Anatol Rapaport, *Operational Philosophy*, Richard H. Brown, *A Poetic for Sociology*, Israel Scheffler, *The Language of Education*, and Max Black, *Models and Metaphors*. Solely because of these two essays, the money paid out for this book will not be wasted. They offer tantalizing glimpses of fresh perspectives and might provide some stimulus for curriculum theorists and historians of curriculum, still stuck in the mid-twentieth century, to join the (post)modern intellectual world. Regrettably, however, there is no connection between these essays and Kliebard’s historical pieces. It is difficult to conceive how someone who could write these two essays could practice history as if he were unaware that his historical pieces are “models” and “metaphors”; that they possess an irreducibly rhetorical, which is to say, metaphorical, status; or that not only is the rhetoric of the vocational education movement a form of “symbolic action,” but so is the rhetoric of the child-study movement and that of the scientific curriculum-making movement. And so by its inclusions and exclusions are his own books and essays. But then, Kliebard is no different than most historians of American education who deny or are oblivious to the fact that the practice of history might entail rhetorical, philosophical, or other methodological considerations.

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The 1920s and 1930s were heady days for the child study movement in North America. Fuelled by an increasing interest in the psychology and welfare of the child, a powerful belief in the knowledge of child “experts,” an interest in parent education, and the philanthropy of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation, university-based laboratory nursery schools and departments of child study were established at numerous campuses in the United States and at McGill University and University of Toronto in Canada. The U.S. Office of Education reported the number of child study-type nursery schools increased from 3 in 1920 to 203 in 1932; half of those in 1932 were university-based programmes. A related movement which shared the emphasis on parent education was the co-operative preschool movement which grew from 262 programmes in 1930 to 1,700 in 1933.

The interest in facilitating children’s development through “scientifically-based” observation and intervention is reflected in two of the *Yearbooks* of the National Society for the Study of Education. The 1929 *Yearbook* was devoted to *Preschool and Parental Education* and the 1940 *Yearbook* was entitled *Intelligence: Its Nature and Nurture*. The contents of the latter volume included such papers as “A Longitudinal Study of the Effects of Nursery School Training on Successive Intelligence-Test