This neglected aspect of his work might one day send Curtis back to the archives for another couple of years. In the meanwhile, readers both in Canada and elsewhere will benefit from a valuable and important study whose relevance far exceeds the history of education. For these “foreign” readers, the brief general introductions to the history of education in Ontario will often not explain quite enough about some key events and personalities in Canadian history. The book, however, will remain worth reading.


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Reading Harold and Pamela Silver’s An Educational War on Poverty is like visiting a familiar friend in a strange and far-away land. The friend is the idealism, the high hopes, the belief that education could be a mechanism for social justice that so marked educational policy-making in the 1960s and early 1970s. Familiar, too, are the names and references: equality of educational opportunity, the Coleman Report, Head Start, the Plowden Report, Basil Bernstein on language decoding. But the strange and the far-away are just as powerful, for the aspirations have nearly disappeared and the political and economic climate in both the United States and Great Britain has mocked those aspirations for more than a decade. It is easy to romanticize the hopes and painful to recall how anyone could have believed in them.

Harold Silver, formerly Principal of Bulmershe College of Higher Education and author of numerous books on educational history and social policy, and Pamela Silver, who has written extensively on education, tell two roughly parallel stories about the social purposes of education. The United States story begins with the discovery of poverty in the late 1950s and early 1960s and the ways it overlapped with race and the expansion of federal involvement in education. The British story is about social class inequality, or more precisely, about unequal access to secondary and post-secondary education which only in the late 1960s became linked to poverty (and belatedly to race).

The Silvers’ goal is to restore what they call “a proper complexity” (p. 4) to what happened, “to rescue complexity from the oversimplifications
and amnesia which rapidly overcome events, especially when sharp changes of political direction are dismissive of policies being overturned" (p. 337)—a clear reference to the conservative politics of the 1980s. In the latter decade, references to the reform era became oversimplified, derogatory, and meanspirited, in contrast, the Silvers argue, to the complexities that were more accurately part of the sixties and seventies.

In the United States, the Great Society began with the surprising discovery of poverty at the end of the 1950s by a post-war generation that had thought primarily in terms of affluence. What began as concern for poverty in rural white America was quickly refocused onto poverty in urban black America. Concerns for what James Conant called “social dynamite” in the cities connected to a nexus of academic research, foundation (especially the Ford Foundation), and federal government beliefs that poor children growing up in the cities were being deprived of the opportunity to succeed and that programmes that attacked their disadvantaged condition would equalize their life chances. The initial symbol was the Ford Foundation’s Great Cities interventions. But the centrepiece of the War on Poverty was Head Start (part of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964) and Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.

The Silvers argue, rightly in my view, that while education was the mainstay of the War on Poverty, it was not the exclusive mechanism for social justice. The Lyndon Johnson programme, while subject to consider-

able criticism from the left, saw education as the most important but by no means the only way to improve opportunity. Still, it was education that would make the Great Society work “by strengthening the preschool measures already in force, by improving the quality of classrooms, by targeting those most in need, by developing motivation, by the expectations of improved job opportunities and changed life styles that resulted from education and expertise” (p. 96).

One outcome was unexpected: the rise of evaluation as a player in educational policy and politics. Akin to the growth of polling in the political arena, a new relationship emerged between politics and social science, a dramatically increased role of the evaluators in setting the language of debate and providing ammunition to policymakers. By the late sixties, it was already becoming necessary to justify programmes based on positive evaluations or to use negative evaluations to make the case that programmes were ineffective. Evaluation itself became part of the policy-making process.

The British story is somewhat different—slower to evolve, less tied to race, less politically explosive. Not until the last half of the 1960s, following the publication of the Plowden report, Children and Their Primary Schools (1967), did a public debate take root over the connection between poverty and educational policy. As in the United States, post-war Britain had assumed that poverty was being eliminated through economic growth; but unlike the U.S., it was also being contained by the welfare state. In the
mid-to-late 1950s, a number of leftist commentators, led by Richard Titmuss, challenged the notion that poverty was disappearing, and they attacked the incompleteness of the government safety net.

The relationship between education and poverty was not initially a focus. Debate about education centred on the lack of access to secondary schooling for the working class, a concern not with poverty but with the more traditional British interest in the relationship between social class and opportunity at the upper end of the educational spectrum, a quite different formulation than occurred in the United States. Political pressure quickly emerged to create comprehensive high schools to increase access, becoming "the principal political issue in domestic affairs" (p. 170, italics in original).

While there were thus considerable parallels between the educational reform movements in each country, and some conversation between academics and, less so, policy-makers across the Atlantic, the American version took on the attributes of a moral crusade focused especially on young children, whereas the British version involved a painful re-examination of the welfare state and the links between social class and access to secondary and higher education. In this setting, the Plowden Report appeared in 1967, reorienting the British educational war on poverty to children and the primary grades.

The Plowden Report was not created de novo. During the 1960s individuals like the socio-linguist Basil Bernstein had been making a determined effort to clarify the relationships between family and community culture, educational achievement, and social class. But the Plowden Report effectively changed the language of public discourse, bringing terms like "positive discrimination" and "educational priority areas" to the fore. In two fascinating chapters, the Silvers discuss the background, workings, and outcomes of the Plowden Committee. Pertinent to the trans-Atlantic dialogue, the Committee chose to mute its knowledge and understanding of the American War on Poverty, in part because it believed conditions and assumptions in the two countries differed and that references to the U.S. might distort the British debate. While the Silvers are not explicit about this, it appears that the Committee was fearful of divisive arguments about the relative place of race in Britain as compared to the U.S.

The Silvers have written a marvelous book, recreating the tensions and aspirations of a generation of policy analysts and reformers in the two countries. Sometimes their attempt to show complexity results in sentences and paragraphs that are themselves more convoluted than need be. And they are clearly as interested in, perhaps even more interested in, the ways academic scholars infused and shaped educational policies as in the policies themselves. Their neglect of classrooms and schools in their analysis is unfortunate, but in this they parallel that neglect among the policy-makers and scholarly analysts of the 1960s and 1970s. But if one wants to
relook at the origins of the educational war on poverty, this is the place to start.

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*Different Drummers* investigates the collision between a black-American, cosmopolitan, modernist musical idiom and a racist, xenophobic, culturally regressive dictatorship. Its author, a jazz musician as well as a prolific social historian of Nazism, is well situated both to reconstruct the German jazz scene and to disentangle the vagaries of Nazi policy toward it. Ranging widely in terms of sources and sub-themes, Michael Kater blends biography and musicology with sociological and administrative history to locate jazz in Nazi culture. The great merit of his work is to document the simultaneity, and in some respects interdependence, of Nazism and jazz, despite their basic incompatibility. Anyone interested in the history of jazz or of Nazi cultural politics will find it indispensable reading.

The primary thrust of *Different Drummers* is to unearth a chapter in jazz history buried by ideological and legal persecution. Drawing heavily on interviews with surviving musicians and fans, on the private archives of the same, as well as on general and specialized periodicals of music, it identifies the key players, hot-spots, and aficionados of the period. Benevolently but not unsparingly, balancing the opinions of contemporaries with critical listening to extant recordings, it portrays a vibrant but relatively narrow, artistically derivative jazz culture. Musically, German jazz failed to develop an independent impulse. Even before Nazi restrictions cramped freedom of expression, it remained overwhelmingly imitative; at best skilful and engaging in its appropriation of Anglo-American trends and at worst maladroit and embarrassing. With growing persecution of jazz musicians and an eventual ban on foreign recordings, German jazz stagnated outside the mainstream of international developments. Sociologically, it was supported by a select group of practitioners and fans who were urban, middle-class, young and cosmopolitan in orientation, and initially often Jewish. Although in diluted form popular as dance music, it never won national popularity comparable to that attained in the United States.

Politically, jazz in the Third Reich experienced a dual ambiguity. *Different Drummers* leaves no doubt that the Nazis were committed to eradication of it as alien, racially degenerate—the flowering of black, American, and allegedly Jewish roots—morally licentious and decadent. Nonetheless, official policy was contradictory and equivocal. Kater identifies the main anti-jazz ideologues, but stresses the uneven